Operations by Russian Aerospace Forces Su-35 air superiority fighters have forced the Ukrainian Air Force’s newly delivered F-16 and Mirage 2000 fighters to operate exclusively at low altitudes in airspace far behind the frontlines, according to recent reports. Flying low and far from Russian forces minimises the possibility of targeting, but limits the kinds of support Ukrainian aircraft can provide for their forces. Commenting on how the Su-35’s presence in the theatre has allegedly shaped Ukrainian fighter operations, Rostec CEO Sergey Chemezov reported: “The Su-35S has driven enemy aircraft low, forcing them to fly at minimal altitudes and in rear areas. Meanwhile, the Su-35S engages targets at distances of hundreds of kilometres. That is why enemy aircraft cannot approach the frontlines to launch air-to-air missiles. This includes American F-16s and French-made Mirages.”
Ukrainian sources have consistently warned that new Western-supplied F-16 and Mirage 2000 fighters are wholly incapable of matching the capabilities of advanced Russian fighters such as the Su-35. Highlighting the much more powerful sensor suites carried by Russian combat jets, and their much longer air-to-air engagement ranges, Ukrainian Air Force spokesman Yuri Ignat observed on June 3: “Unfortunately, today Russia has jets that see farther and missiles that fly farther. That’s even when compared to F-16s. They also have powerful air defences, which work in tandem with aviation.” Ignat in March compared the F-16 to the Su-35 specifically stating: “The modifications that Ukraine has cannot compete one-on-one in an air battle. We need a comprehensive approach as the [Russian] Su-35 is a relatively new jet… This includes ground-based air defence, electronic warfare systems, and ideally, an airborne radar. Also crucial are onboard radars for our aircraft and air-to-air missiles.”
Although the Su-35 benefits from a very wide margin of superiority over Ukrainian fighters, it remains uncertain whether the aircraft’s operations have indeed been a primary factor driving them to maintain low altitudes and great distances from the frontlines as claimed by Chemezov. The fighter’s air-to-air capabilities have been overshadowed by those of the MiG-31BM interceptor and Su-57 fifth generation fighter which have also been involved in air-to-air engagements, and which carry significantly more powerful sensor suites and have flight characteristics better suited to beyond visual range missile exchanges. A further factor has been Russia’s vast network of advanced surface-to-air missile system, such as the S-400, which are capable of shooting down targets at ranges of up to 400 kilometres. These assets between them, combined with operations by fighters such as the Su-35 an Su-30SM, are likely to have all contributed to seriously limiting Ukraine’s ability to use its fleet of largely obsolete fighters.
The Su-35 was in July confirmed to have operationalised the R-77M active radar guided air-to-air missile, revolutionising its air-to-air performance and significantly widening its margin of superiority over Ukrainian and most NATO fighters. Further commenting on Su-35 operations in the Ukrainain theatre, Chemezov observed that it “performs miracles in skilled hands. Importantly, Russian pilots rate highly the aircraft’s capabilities.” Regarding roles other than air-to-air combat, he observed that the fighter also “effectively engage enemy surface-to-air missile systems.” Footage has at times emerged of the aircraft equipped with Kh-31P anti-radiation missiles developed specifically for such a role, with the fighter’s triple radars including wing root L-band radars expected to provide it with advanced jamming capabilities that are valuable for such roles. Although it has been confirmed that the Su-35’s less costly and less specialised counterpart, the Su-30SM2, has achieved at least one successful strike against Ukraine’s most high value air defence system the MIM-104 Patriot, the Su-35’s combat record in targeting hostile air defences is much less well known.