<p >Following Israel’s initiation of a large scale air offensive against Iran on June 13, and the United States’ active joining of the campaign nine days later using B-2 bombers and nuclear powered attack submarines, the capabilities of the Iranian Air Force’s fighter fleet has gained growing attention. Although Iran fields a particularly large fleet of close to 300 fighters, the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/poor-deterrent-iran-fleet-300-fighters-equipped-stop-israel" target="_blank">obsolescence</a> of its predominantly Vietnam War era aircraft was a primary factor <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/absent-iran-ultra-long-range-fakour90-missiles-firing-israeli" target="_blank">preventing its Air Force</a> from making a significant contribution to air defence duties, with participation in counter strikes on Israeli or American targets considered even less viable. These limitations placed a heavy burden on Iran’s more modern <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/iran-top-air-defence-bavar373-f35-shootdowns" target="_blank">ground-based air defence</a> network to protect the country’s airspace, and on its sizeable <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/iran-launches-first-strike-isreal-mach-13-fattah-hypersonic" target="_blank">ballistic missile arsenal </a>and drone fleet for counter strikes.&nbsp;The lack of a viable fighter fleet is considered to have been a <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/could-su35-j10c-fighters-saved-iran-marine-analyst" target="_blank">pivotal factor</a> in Tehran’s failure to deter Israel and its supporters in the Western world from initiating hostilities.</p><p ><img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/07/06/article_686a136eedfbf8_76775132.jpg" title="Iranian Air Force F-4D/E Fighters"></p><p >The future of the Iranian fighter fleet has long been widely speculated, with the country having been reported in the 1990s to be negotiating to procure modernised Russian MiG-29 fighters and <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-mig31bm-deliver-prized" target="_blank">MiG-31 interceptors</a>. Reports of interest in both aircraft continued into the 2000s, while the following decade unconfirmed reports indicated that a license production deal for the Su-30 was under consideration. The fleet’s future today remains highly uncertain, with Iranian sources having <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/iranian-air-force-su35s-plan-russia" target="_blank">reported since 2022</a> that Su-35 fighters have been ordered, although deliveries have not materialised. More recently, speculation has grown that the country could procure Chinese J-10C fighters, which are <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/china-s-j-10c-reportedly-crushed-the-russian-su-35-in-combat-exercises-how-the-firebird-came-out-on-top" target="_blank">more sophisticated</a> than their Russian counterparts, and would provide a hedge against over reliance on Moscow as a supplier. After Pakistan Air Force J-10Cs was credited with <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/pakistani-j10c-shot-down-indian-rafale" target="_blank">major victories</a> against some of India’s most capable fighters in early may, the aircraft’s appeal to foreign clients was expected to increase.&nbsp;</p><p ><img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/07/05/article_68693d80dda681_56014882.jpg" title="J-20 Leads J-16 (top) and J-10C in Formation"></p><p >Iran’s near unique combination of a sizeable defence budget, imminent security challenges, and a very large fleet of fighters in need of replacement, has made the future of its air force a topic of particularly widespread speculation. An assessment of Iran’s defence needs, however, indicates that the most optimal fighter for the country may be the Chinese J-16, rather than the much lighter J-10C or competing Russian aircraft. The J-16 was developed as a heavyweight counterpart to the J-10C as part of a high-low combination, and is broadly considered an analogue to the<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/f15ex-procurements-32percent-why-air-force-more" target="_blank"> U.S. Air Force F-15EX</a>, where the J-10C is an analogue to the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/usaf-f16s-20yrs-f35-resume" target="_blank">F-16 Block 70</a>, although the two Chinese designs are considerably newer and have significant advantages over their American counterparts. The fighters are heavily enhanced fourth generation designs that were developed using technologies from fifth generation programs, with their composite materials, stealth coatings, weaponry, sensors and other avionics having&nbsp; commonalities with those of the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/j20-equip-elite-fighter-unit-guarding-beijing-2nd-brigade" target="_blank">J-20 fighter</a>. While the J-10C is a lightweight and relatively short ranged aircraft with a modest radar size, however, the J-16 combines similarly sophisticated technologies with one of the largest airframes and highest endurances in the world.&nbsp;</p><p ><img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/07/05/article_6868d543f30369_88501588.png" title="J-16 Overflies Chinese Beach in Early 2025"></p><p >The J-16 was developed as a very heavily enhanced derivative of the Soviet Su-27 Flanker air superiority fighter, and thus shares a linage with the Russian Su-30, Su-34 and Su-35, although China fields such aircraft in significantly greater numbers than Russia does and has brought their capabilities up to a far higher standard. Like all Flankers, the J-16 is&nbsp;capable of carrying some of the highest internal fuel loads and weapons payloads and one of the largest radars of any tactical combat jet in the world. Although its radar’s size is similar to those of Russian heavyweight fighters such as Su-35, it is considerably more sophisticated reflecting the vast discrepancies in the Chinese and Russian electronics industries and broader technological bases. The J-16 and its carrier based counterpart the J-15B are the only fighters that combine such large radars with comparably high levels of sophistication, with American fighters with similarly advanced radars all being restricted to carrying far smaller primary sensors. The F-35, for example, carries the AN/APG-81 radar which is less than half the size of the J-16’s own.&nbsp;</p><p ><img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/07/05/article_68693e8755e118_86074844.jpeg" title="J-16 Fighter"></p><p >Like the J-10C, the J-16 has advantages over competing Russian fighters across a wide spectrum of performance parameters, with its situational awareness being far higher due to use of more advanced data links and superior sensors, while its air-to-air missiles are significantly more formidable. The PL-15 and PL-16 missiles are broadly considered to be equivalents to the American AIM-260, and far outperform Russia’s R-77-1 which equips its frontline fighter units. Its advantages in visual range combat are similarly wide due to the advanced capabilities of the PL-10 missile, which allows for off boresight targeting at more extreme angles. </p><p >The J-10C is limited by its much shorter range and smaller radar, which restrict its ability to protect Iran’s particularly vast airspace, and leaves it vulnerable to the targeting of airbases by preventing it front landing at or operating from further&nbsp; facilities. Israel and the United States’ growing reliance on F-35s with advanced stealth capabilities is also expected to pose serious challenges to the J-10C’s radar, even if networked with ground-based systems. Much like the F-15EX, which has been evaluated in the Untied States to have a respectable detection range against advanced stealth fighters, the J-16’s own much larger radar is expected to also provide a robust defence against penetration strikes using stealth aircraft.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p><p ><img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/07/05/article_68693edf4a2119_69977421.jpg" title="Israeli F-35s and F-15s Refuel in the Air During Simulated Attack on Iran"></p><p >Although Iran is not expected to be able to afford a large fleet of J-16s, the fighter class’ considerable superiority over anything in Israel’s fleet other than its small number of F-35s would make it a game changer. Discrepancies in sensors and weaponry would allow even a small number of J-16s to engage large squadrons of F-15s and F-16s in both visual and beyond visual range engagements, with the extent of the technological gap expected to more than compensate for Israeli advantages in pilot training. A further primary advantage of the J-16 is that it is capable of employing oversized PL-XX air-to-air missiles, which are far too large for the J-10C to carry, and are well optimised for targeting large support aircraft such as tankers and AEW&amp;Cs, as well as strategic bombers. With the very short ranged F-16 forming the bulk of Israel’s fleet, and relying heavily on aerial refuelling to launch sorties against Iranian targets, the ability to threaten these would be a potential game changer. The ability to threaten AEW&amp;Cs could also seriously hinder command and control efforts and reduce situational awareness. The missile is compatible with the J-16 due to its very high weapons carrying capacity and particularly large and powerful radars, while the&nbsp;J-16’s own range make its operations much less predictable and could allow it to take to the offensive against high value support aircraft by flying outside Iranian airspace.</p><p ><img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/07/05/article_6868d571b73950_33094205.JPG" title="J-16 Fighters with PL-XX, PL-15, PL-12 and PL-10 Missiles"></p><p >The Iranian Air Force already operates fourth generation heavyweight fighters, namely the F-14 and the Su-24M, while also fielding two squadrons of medium weight MiG-29s. With the J-16’s maintenance requirements and operational costs estimated to be significantly lower than those of the F-14 or Su-24, its operational requirements are not expected to impose an unprecedented burden on the Iranian fleet. A primary difficulty in transitioning to the new fighter will be in training, as the J-16 is technologically approximately three decades ahead of current Iranian fighters, meaning the tactics for its employment will be almost entirely different. A further potential difficulty is that China has never offered the J-16 for export, which is thought to be a result of the Su-27 design’s Soviet origins, meaning Russian permission may be required. Russia’s reliance on Iranian drone supplies for its ongoing war effort in Ukraine, however, and the its historically <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/iran-trust-russia-fighter-no-deals" target="_blank">limited willingness</a> to supply its own fighters to the country, could lead it to accept such a sale. </p><p >Chinese concerns regarding the use of the J-16 abroad may also be mitigated by the significant progress that the country’s fifth and <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/worlds-largest-fighter-plane-china-ultra-long-range-sixth-gen" target="_blank">sixth generation fighter programs</a> have made, which makes the potential compromising of a ‘4+ generation’ aircraft a less sensitive issue. A willingness to export the J-10C to countries with close security ties with the United States, such as Pakistan and Egypt, which appear to present much greater risks of technologies falling into adversary hands, indicates than the risks from the sale of the only marginally more sensitive J-16 to a much lower risk client may be considered acceptable.&nbsp;</p>